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Abstract
We develop a game-theoretic analysis of terrorism that examines
the interaction between a terrorist organization and multiple target
countries, and considers both pre-emption and deterrence as counter-
terrorist policies. The damage from terror includes not only the mate-
rial cost of fatality, injury and loss of property, but also the resultant
fear. The fear-effect leads to different kinds of equilibria and implica-
tions for counter-terrorism policies. In particular, the model identifies
conditions under which greater pre-emption may be the rational re-
sponse to an increase in terrorism, i.e., it analyzes the merit of the
dictum: “offense is the best defense.” Further, it examines the char-
acteristics of cooperative behavior among target countries in dealing
with the threat of terrorism.
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1 Introduction
This is the way the world ends,
This is the way the world ends,
This is the way the world ends,
Not with a whimper, but a bang.
- With apologies to T.S. Elliot.
Terrorism has become a global phenomenon and a matter of concern
for both developed and developing countries. While there is a large list of
terrorist organizations, many of which are ‘local’ and target one particular
country, over the last two decades some terrorist organizations have been
targeting multiple countries. Al-Qaeda is the prime example at present.1 In
the 1990s, the Abu Nadal Organization (ANO) carried out activities against
twenty countries, including U.S., France, Israel and various Arab countries
(U.S. Department of State, 1997).2
Multi-country targeting not only involves strategic interdependence be-
tween a terrorist organization and individual countries, it implies such inter-
dependence among the target countries themselves. In this paper, we adopt
a game-theoretic approach to study this problem, by explicitly formulating
the choice problem facing a terrorist organization and its target countries.
In the game-theory terminology it can be called a common-enemy problem.3
We consider a two-stage game where, in the first stage, the countries simul-
taneously decide on their levels of both pre-emption and deterrence, followed
in the next stage by the organization deciding on its levels of attack.
Attacks are conceptualized through the notion of a production function
relating ‘terror input’ to potential damage. Damage from terror not only
includes direct effects like loss of property and human tragedy in the form of
casualties and fatalities, but is also meant to encompass the fear it engenders
among the public. In other words, terrorism is viewed as production of terror.
As recognized since Hobbs, human life is governed by a social contract, which
pre-supposes social stability. Terror is aimed at undermining this very sta-
1Not only does Al-Qaeda itself targets many countries, it purportedly supports local
or regional terrorist organizations, thus creating inter-linkages among the activities of the
latter.
2Since Abu Nadal’s death in 2002 the ANO has remained largely passive.
3Mirza and Verdier (2006) also stresses the necessity of such a formulation, but they
stop short of setting up a formal analytical model.
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bility, leading to significant distortions in social contracts. Recently, Becker
and Rubinstein (2005) have argued that small-probability events such as an
incident of terror can, via producing fear, have major effects on people’s util-
ity and well-being. According to Richman et. al. (2008), 9/11 has had a
lingering effect on mental health of Americans in the form of depression, anx-
iety, drinking etc. Additional empirical evidence that terrorism typically has
large effects on economic outcomes is provided by Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003).4
Amain innovation of this paper is to characterize fear and its implications.
More specifically, we differentiate between weak-marginal-fear and strong-
marginal-fear, referring to whether an increase in the deployment of the terror
input leads to a decrease, or an increase in its marginal effect on expected
damage. We consider equilibrium in each of these two cases – as well as in
a situation, where, depending on the magnitude of the attacks, there could
be a regime switch from weak-marginal-fear to strong-marginal-fear. In the
presence of regime switch there could be an equilibrium, which we shall
call brink-of-panic (BOP for short), in which the terrorist organization is
indifferent between operating in the weak and the strong-marginal fear regime
(to be made precise later). Interestingly, the resultant situation is knife-edge
in the aggregate in that an arbitrarily small reduction in pre-emption by any
target country would lead to a drastic increase in the scale of attack by the
Organization with the countries ‘plunging’ into panic, but it can be sustained
as a (self-enforcing) Nash-equilibrium. Furthermore, multiple equilibria may
arise.
One of the main predictions of our model is that as a response to an
increase in the potency of the organization – interpreted as an increase in
terrorism – the target countries scale up their security-deterrence measures,
but may either decrease or increase pre-emption, depending on whether the
marginal-fear effect is weak or strong. Along the BOP equilibrium ‘an in-
crease in terrorism’ necessarily leads to an increase in pre-emption, despite
the fact that the equilibrium occurs in the weak-marginal-fear region.
Inter alia, our results demonstrate the usefulness of explicitly modeling
the terrorist organization as an optimizing agent. In comparison to San-
dler and Sequeira (2006) for example, who adopt a reduced-form approach
and directly postulate that (a) an increase in security-deterrence by one tar-
4In their follow-up work, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) argue that mobility of pro-
ductive capital in an open economy may account for much of the impact of terrorism.
2
get country induces the terrorist organization to focus more on other target
countries and (b) pre-emption measures undertaken by target countries that
reduce the overall strike capacity of the organization are strategic substi-
tutes, our analysis shows that depending on institutional realities, these may
or may not hold, so that imposing these properties by fiat may be misleading.
Another insight is that the equilibrium nature of counter-terrorism poli-
cies and how they respond to changes in parameters facing the terrorist orga-
nization, depend on the characteristics of fear. In particular, the model sheds
light on the merit of the dictum, “offense is the best defense”, i.e., whether
more offense is the optimal response to a higher threat of terrorism. We find
that this is true in the strong marginal-fear, or what we call in section 3, the
panic equilibrium, as well as in the BOP equilibrium. But it does not hold
in the weak-marginal-fear or the no-panic equilibrium.
In terms of welfare implications for target countries we find that there is a
role for cooperation irrespective of whether the marginal fear effect is weak or
strong, and whether pre-emption measures are strategic substitutes or com-
plements. Under cooperation the aggregate level of pre-emption is higher
compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium, while security-deterrence lev-
els by individual countries are lower. These results hold as long as there are
no possible regime switches. If a regime switch from weak to strong-marginal
fear is possible however, additional implications follow. In the BOP equilib-
rium explicit collusion may not be required at all – because the countries
coordinate on the appropriate levels of pre-emption anyway so as to avoid
panic. Furthermore, the presence of multiple equilibria imply that, even in
the absence of explicit collusion, coordination alone can be welfare improving.
We finally relate our paper to the literature, in particular the game theo-
retic ones.5 Das and Lahiri (2006) have formulated a non-cooperative game
between one terrorist organization and one target country, in which the for-
mer selects its scale of attack and the latter its security-deterrence level.
They do not allow for multiple countries, or pre-emption though. Sandler
and Siqueira (2006) do consider interdependence between target countries –
in terms of choosing the levels of deterrence and pre-emptive strikes – but the
behavior of the terrorist organization remains implicit. Postulating ‘reduced-
form’ externalities between target countries is subject to a ‘Lucas-type cri-
tique’. An ad hoc analysis of this kind has two problems. First, functions
5There is an earlier theoretical literature dealing with hostage scenarios and subsequent
negotiations between terrorists and governments.
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representing externalities between target countries may change when some
parameters facing either these countries or the organization change. Second,
the presumed nature of externalities – however intuitive they may be – may
not be valid.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we set up
the basic model, and analyze the case where the marginal-fear effect is either
uniformly strong, or uniformly weak. In section 3, we examine an integrated
model that allows for a regime switch from weak to strong-marginal-fear.
Section 4 discusses some extensions of our model and concludes the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 General Features
An economic analysis dealing with a terrorist organization and target coun-
tries is built on two maintained hypotheses. (1) Like the countries, the
terrorist organization is a rational entity, taking into account benefits and
opportunity costs of its actions. (2) Reducing damage from terror is costly
for a target country and these costs are taken to consideration while setting
counter-terrorism policies; in other words, countries do not aim to reduce or
eliminate terror at any arbitrarily high cost.
In our model there is one terrorist organization – henceforth called the
Organization – and at least two target countries, indexed by i ∈ {1, 2, .., I}.
We view terrorist acts in terms of a production function. Let xi denote the
level of a composite input being used against country i. We will call it the
terror input supplied to country i. The strategy vector of the Organization
is (x1, · · · , xI), where xi ≥ 0.
The target countries choose security-deterrence, as well as pre-emptive
measures, each represented by a univariate index, namely, si and zi respec-
tively. The strategy vector of country i is thus a non-negative vector (si,
zi).
The target countries and the Organization play a two-stage game, with
the former moving first and simultaneously, choosing the level of their counter-
terrorism measures, followed by the latter in stage two, choosing its terror
input levels. The nature of timing amounts to commitment on the part of
the target countries with respect to counter-terrorism policies.6 We ignore re-
6It will be noted later that in a simultaneous game, optimal pre-emption is always zero.
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peated interactions, or negotiations between the Organization and the target
countries.
The expected damage to a country, Di, is a function of xi and si, i.e.,
Di = F (si, xi). We assume F (si, xi) : [0,∞)
2 → [0,∞), where the function
F (·) is adequately differentiable. This function is a product of two functions
P = P (si
−
, xi
−
) and y(x
+
), where P is the probability of success in implementing
terrorist activities and y is the potential damage, i.e., the total damage if the
activities succeed. The higher the level of security-deterrence, the greater is
probability of detection and hence the smaller is the probability of success.
It is natural to assume
A1: Fs(si, xi) < 0, Fss(si, xi) ≥ 0, Fsx(si, xi) ≤ 0,
i.e. the expected damage is decreasing and convex in the level of deterrence
and the marginal damage with respect to the terror input is decreasing in
the level of deterrence.
In general, x has two opposing effects on F (x, s). First, there is the
direct effect through the production function y(x). While, in a narrow sense,
y(x) can be thought of as some single index capturing casualties, fatalities
and loss of property, we will interpret it more generally. Given that causing
fear among the common mass is the hall-mark of terrorism as a form of
conflict, we presume that y(x) includes the psychological damage from fear.
The contagiousness of fear motivates a further assumption that y′′(x) > 0.7
Second, ceteris paribus, a higher level of xi attracts greater visibility and
chance of detection, which has a negative impact on F (s, x). In general,
Fx(si, xi) = P (si, xi)y
′(xi) + Px(si, xi)y(xi) ≷ 0. But it is natural to assume
that the direct effect dominates, so that
A2: Fx(si, xi) > 0.
8
Importantly, observe that Fxx ≶ 0. Clearly, the sign and the magnitude
7Thus, fear is dependent on the magnitude of terrorist attempts, not on the rate of
their success. Alternatively, one can add another tier or mapping on F (·), say F [F (·)],
with F ′ > 0, F ′′ > 0, where F represents both fear and the material damage caused.
This would imply F = F¯(s, x). Imposing analogous assumptions on the F¯ function would
yield the same results.
8Otherwise, the Organization would have no incentive to launch any terrorist activity
against country i, i.e., the problem of terrorism would not arise.
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of Fxx depend on the strength of fear relative to the negative visibility effect
of an increase in xi. More precisely, Fxx > 0 if the marginal fear effect is
relatively strong, i.e., if y′′(·) is sufficiently large. Otherwise, Fxx < 0. As
one might expect, the qualitative aspects of variations in equilibrium policy
level would depend on the sign and magnitude of Fxx.
We do not model the long-term goal of the Organization; neither do we
take a position on how reasonable it is. Our primitive is that there is a group
of sympathizers behind the ‘cause’ and the Organization is an outgrowth
of that. It derives its utility from the expected damage it is able to directly
inflict on the target countries, equal to ΣiDi. It is presumed that all countries
are targeted equally.9
The Organization also cares about the cost of its ‘production.’ These
include the cost of recruiting, financing and training terrorists, cost of equip-
ment and that of building and maintaining infrastructure etc. They are
specified by
T = C
(
Z + α
(+)
, X
(+)
)
+Σic(xi
(+)
), CZX > 0, where Z ≡ Σizi, X ≡ Σixi. (1)
The functions C(·) and c(·) respectively are the ‘common-resource’ and
country-specific costs. The former would include, for example, the costs of
maintaining infrastructure to train terrorists. Note that Z is the aggregate
level of pre-emptive measures undertaken by all target countries. An increase
in Z (in terms of bombing terrorist bases, freezing suspect funds etc.) shifts
up the Organization’s cost function.10
A decrease in α reflects either a technology improvement or an exoge-
nous infusion of resources for the Organization. It can be interpreted as the
Organization becoming more potent or simply ‘an increase in terrorism’.
The positive sign of the cross partial in the C(·) function means that
an increase in aggregate pre-emption or a decrease in the potency of the
Organization increases its common-resource marginal cost.
We assume increasing marginal country-specific costs i.e.,
A4: c′′(x) > 0.
9In the concluding section we discuss some implications of allowing for asymmetric
targeting.
10This specification ignores country-specific pre-emptive actions, and thereby enables
us to differentiate this policy sharply from security-deterrence which is largely a country-
specific policy.
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At this point we do not impose any restriction on the sign of CXX , i.e.,
whether the common-resource marginal cost function is increasing, constant
or decreasing. We shall see below that the sign of CXX will determine the
nature of the cross effect of security-deterrence choice by one country on the
Organization’s choice of terror input toward another.
2.2 The Organization’s Problem: Stage 2
It seeks to maximize ΣiDi − T with respect to (x1, · · · , xI), given si and zi.
The first-order conditions are:
Fx(si, xi) = CX(Z + α,X) + c
′(xi), ∀i. (2)
The left-hand and right-hand side expressions respectively indicate the marginal
benefit and marginal cost facing the Organization. We impose that
A5: (i) |c′′| is sufficiently large, such that Fxx(·) − ICXX(·) − c
′′(·) < 0,
Fxx(·)− c
′′(·) < 0 and (ii) |Fxx(·)− CXX(·)− c
′′(·)| > (I − 1)|CXX(·)|,
which ensures that the second-order conditions for the Organization’s prob-
lem are met.
The following proposition summarizes the response of the Organization
to changes in deterrence and pre-emptive measures.
Proposition 1 Let assumptions A1-A5 hold. An increase in the aggregate
pre-emption forces the Organization to lower its scale of activities in all target
countries, while an increase in security-deterrence by country i induces the
Organization to (a) decrease xi but (b) increase, leave unchanged or decrease
xj (j 6= i) as CXX R 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
The first part of Proposition 1 is apparent. It is also intuitive that if
country i enhances its security-deterrence measure, the Organization scales
xi down. Aggregate level of terror input, X, tends to fall. This decreases or
increases the marginal cost of using common resources as CXX ≷ 0. In turn,
it decreases or increases the ‘total’ marginal cost of xj – and therefore induces
the Organization to step up or reduce xj – according as CXX ≷ 0. Hence,
unlike Sandler and Sequeira (2006), it is not necessary that the Organization
would redirect its activities more toward a particular country if it faces more
stringent security-deterrence measures in another.
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Having noted Proposition 1, we however assume henceforth, for the sake
of analytical tractability, the intermediate case of
A6: CXX = 0.
This assumption essentially implies no externalities between target countries
originating from their choice with regard to security-deterrence. Given A6,
we can specify, without loss of generality,
C = (Z + α)(Σixi) + Σic(xi). (3)
Accordingly, (2) simplifies to
Fx(si, xi) = Z + α + c
′(xi). (4)
In keeping with Proposition 1, (4) implicitly yields xi = g(si, Z + α), where
∂g
∂si
=
Fsx
c′′ − Fxx
< 0;
∂g
∂Z
= −
1
c′′ − Fxx
< 0. (5)
2.3 Counter-Terrorism Measures by Target Countries:
Stage 1
The target countries incur the damage from terror, as well as the costs of
security-deterrence and pre-emptive measures. Let the latter two be indi-
cated by βiu(si) and λiv(zi) respectively. The total cost function is given by
Ωi(xi, si, zi) = F (si, xi) + βiu(si) + λiv(zi). We assume
A7: u′, v′, u′′, v′′ > 0,
i.e. the respective cost functions are convex. A target country’s objective is
to minimize this cost. Note that the benefit to country i from pre-emption
enters through the Organization’s choice of xi. Thus, had we assumed a
simultaneous game, it would have meant minimizing Ωi at given xi, implying
optimal zi to be zero.
Because of the two-stage nature of the game, the qualitative nature of
equilibrium would, in general, depend partly on third-order derivatives. For
analytical simplicity as well as ease of interpretation, we assume however
that
8
A8: Fss, Fsx, Fxx, c
′′, u′′ and v′′ are all constant.
In what follows we compare non-cooperative equilibrium with cooperative
equilibrium in which the target countries coordinate their counter-terrorism
policies. The optimization problems facing the countries in the two scenarios
would require various second-order conditions to be met. These are collec-
tively captured in:
A9:
(R1) c′′ > Fxx. (6)
(R2) λiv
′′(c′′ − Fxx)
2Ai −Bi > 0, where
Ai ≡ (Fss + βiu
′′)(c′′ − Fxx)
2 + (2c′′ − Fxx)F
2
sx
Bi = (c
′′)2F 2sx −AiFxx. (7)
(R3) K ≡

λ1A˜v
′′(c′′ − Fxx)
2 − B˜ .... −B˜
−B˜ .... −B˜
....
....
−B˜ .... λIA˜v
′′(c′′ − Fxx)
2 − B˜

is positive semi-definite,
where A˜ =
1∑
i 1/Ai
; B˜ = (c′′)2F 2sx − IA˜Fxx. (8)
In this section we assume that Fxx is either positive or negative for all x > 0;
given this, A9 is met if c′′, βi and λi are large enough.
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We now analyze the non-cooperative Nash behavior of target countries in
stage 1. Country i aims to:
min
si,zi
Ωi(si, z1, · · · , zI) = F [si, g(si, Z + α)] + βiu(si) + λiv(zi) (9)
subject to (5). Under our assumption of CXX = 0, country i’s cost is not
affected by any other country’s security-deterrence measures. But it is af-
fected (partly) by others’ choice of pre-emption levels. This is the basis of
11All conditions in A9 need not be binding, e.g., if Fxx ≤ 0, (6) is met for any c
′′ > 0.
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externality between the choices of pre-emption, which is not internalized in
the non-cooperative equilibrium.12
The following first-order conditions hold for country i:
∂Ωi
∂si
= Fs(·) + Fx(·)
∂g
∂si
+ βiu
′(si) = 0
⇔ βiu
′(si) =
[
−Fs(·)−
Fx(·)Fsx
c′′ − Fxx
]
. (10)
∂Ωi
∂zi
= Fx(·)
∂g
∂Z
+ λiv
′(zi) = 0
⇔ λiv
′(zi) =
[
Fx(·)
c′′ − Fxx
]
. (11)
Remarks:
1. In (10) and (11), the left-hand-side terms are respectively the marginal
costs of deterrence and pre-emption, which are increasing in their re-
spective arguments.
2. The marginal benefits are indicated by the terms in the right-hand
side. From (10), the marginal benefit of deterrence decreases with de-
terrence.13 But, from (11),
Lemma 1 The marginal benefit of pre-emption increases or decreases
with pre-emption as Fxx ≶ 0.
This will serve as the key in understanding the role of pre-emptive mea-
sures. Suppose Fxx < 0, i.e., the marginal damage from the terror input
is diminishing. It implies that the lower the level of this input, the higher
is the marginal damage. Because a higher zi implies, ceteris paribus, a
higher Z and hence a lower level of xi, it follows that at a higher level of
pre-emption, the marginal benefit from pre-emption is higher. Likewise,
if Fxx > 0, the marginal benefit decreases with pre-emption.
Earlier, we have discussed that the greater the fear effect, the higher is
the value of Fxx. Hence, a corollary of Lemma 1 is that the marginal
benefit of pre-emption increases or decrease with pre-emption, as the
marginal fear effect is sufficiently large or small.
12Such externality would not arise if all pre-emptive actions were country-specific.
13The derivative of the term in the square bracket of (10) with respect to si equals
−Fss − c
′′F 2sx/(c
′′ − Fxx)
2, which is negative.
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Eqs. (10) and (11) imply the following rankings of counter-terrorism
policies across countries.
Proposition 2 If βi = βj and λi < λj, then si = sj and zi > zj. Whereas
if βi < βj and λi = λj, then si > sj and zi < zj.
The following proposition relates the levels of two policies employed by a
target country, as well as whether pre-emption levels chosen across countries
are strategic substitutes or complements.
Proposition 3 (A) At any given vector of pre-emption levels chosen by
other countries, security-deterrence (si) and pre-emption (zi) chosen by any
target country are gross substitutes.
(B) As long as security-deterrence levels are adjusted optimally, pre-emption
levels chosen across the target countries are strategic complements or substi-
tutes as the marginal fear effect is weak or strong enough such that Bi ≷ 0
(where Bi is defined in (R2)).
(C) Given that pre-emption levels by other countries are adjusted optimally,
si and zi are net substitutes or complements, as the marginal fear effect is
weak or strong enough such that Bi ≷ 0.
Proof. (A) Eq. (10) implicitly defines si as a function of Z + α, with
dsi
d(Z + α)
=
c′′Fsx
Ai
< 0.14 (12)
Thus, at any given Z ′ ≡ Z − zi, si and zi are negatively related.
(B) There are two components. By definition, Bi ≷ 0 as Fxx ≶ (c′′)2F 2sx/Ai.
If, in the terror production function |y′′| is large enough, i.e., the marginal
fear effect is high enough, Fxx would be positive and large enough to out-
weigh (c′′)2F 2sx/Ai. Otherwise, Fxx is positive and small enough or negative
such that Fxx < (c
′′)2F 2sx/Ai. This is how the marginal fear effect is related
to the sign of Bi.
Next, substitute (12) into (11) to implicitly express zi as a function of
Z + α with
dzi
d(Z + α)
=
Bi
λiv′′(c′′ − Fxx)2Ai
. (13)
14Given A1, A3 and (R1), Ai > 0.
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Hence dzi/dzj ≷ 0 according as Bi ≷ 0.
(C) Finally, (12) and (13) imply
dsi
dzi
=
λiv
′′(c′′ − Fxx)
2c′′Fsx
Bi
≶ 0 as Bi ≷ 0. (14)
It is important to understand why, unlike the case of public-good provi-
sion, pre-emption levels may not be strategic substitutes and, why security-
deterrence and pre-emption may be net substitutes or complements.
Considering the first initially, there are two effects at work. Suppose zj
increases. It tends to increase the aggregate level of pre-emption, thereby
shifting up the marginal cost function facing the Organization. It reduces
the supply of terror input to any particular country i. This induces coun-
try i to reduce its security-deterrence. Since security-deterrence and pre-
emptive measures are gross substitutes, a reduction in the former tends to
imply a higher level of pre-emption by country i. In brief, because of substi-
tutability between security-deterrence and pre-emption as alternative forms
of counter-terrorism policies, pre-emption levels across target countries tend
to be strategic complements.15
The other effect relates to the interdependence between zi and zj at any
given vector of si’s. If the marginal fear effect is weak enough to the extent
that Fxx < 0, then by Lemma 1, the marginal benefit from pre-emption in-
creases with pre-emption. As an increase in zj tends to increase aggregate
pre-emption, the marginal benefit from zi increases. Country i responds by
increasing zi. On this account also pre-emption levels are strategic comple-
ments.16 But, by analogous reasoning, if the marginal fear effect is strong
enough so that Fxx > 0, pre-emption choices across countries would be strate-
gic substitutes at given si’s.
Combining these two effects yields that pre-emption levels may be strate-
gic complements or substitutes. If Fxx < 0, the fear effect is weak and
works in the same direction as the gross substitutability effect. If 0 < Fxx <
(c′′)2F 2sx, the fear effect works in the opposite direction but is outweighed by
15This is captured by the positive term (c′′)2F 2sx in the definition of Bi. Indeed, if
countries were to keep their security-deterrence levels unchanged, this term would not
appear in dzi/dzj.
16Algebraically it is verified by the fact that if Fxx < 0, the term Bi is unambiguously
positive.
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Figure 1: Non-Cooperative Equilibrium: The Case of Weak Marginal Fear
the gross substitutability effect. The net result is that pre-emption choices
are strategic complements. It is only when the fear effect is strong enough
to outweigh the substitutability effect between deterrence and pre-emption,
pre-emption choices are strategic substitutes.
Finally, as detailed above, an increase in aggregate pre-emption, on the
one hand, implies a decline in security-deterrence, and, on the other, may
induce a particular country to increase or reduce its level of pre-emption
measures depending on the strength of the marginal fear effect. This ex-
plains why security-deterrence and pre-emption may be net substitutes or
complements.
The nature of the overall equilibrium thus depends whether the marginal
fear effect is weak or strong.
2.4 Weak Marginal Fear Effect: Bi > 0
The solution is illustrated in Figure 1. Given that Bi > 0, (13) implies that
dzi/dZ > 0. Hence the zi = φi(Z) schedule in the right quadrant is upward
sloping. The left quadrant shows the negative relationship between si and zi
in view of (14).
Summing up φi(Z) curves vertically yields the Σiφi(Z) ≡ φ¯(Z) curve. As
shown in the Appendix, condition (8) implies φ¯′(Z) < 1. Thus the φ¯(Z) curve
intersects the 45◦ line. An equilibrium exists and it is unique. The point Zn
13
marks the equilibrium level of aggregate pre-emption, where superscript n
stands for non-cooperation. The pre-emption level chosen by country i is
read off the φi(Z) curve, indicated by z
n
i . The corresponding solution of s
n
i
is obtained in the second quadrant.
We now consider the comparative-statics effects of a decrease in the pa-
rameter α, which poses the question of how target countries react when the
Organization becomes more potent. From (13), as α decreases, the φi(Z)
and φ¯(Z) curves shift down. The implication is that each target country
lowers its level of pre-emptive activity. Furthermore, given that Bi > 0 and
thus security-deterrence and pre-emption are net substitutes, a lower zi is
associated with a higher si. In summary, the target countries ‘beef up’ their
security-deterrence measures but reduce pre-emptive measures.
Intuitively, as α falls, the Organization tends to step up the terror input
in each country. To counter this the target countries enhance their security-
deterrence levels. Gross substitutability between security-deterrence and pre-
emption implies that each country tends to lower the level of pre-emption.
In addition, a weak fear effect implies either a decline in the marginal benefit
from pre-emption as the Organization increases its terror input, inducing
a target country to lower its pre-emptive measure or a weak increase in
marginal benefit from pre-emption and hence a small increase in the level of
pre-emption, which is outweighed by the decrease in pre-emption due to the
gross substitutability effect. The net effect on pre-emption is negative.
2.5 Strong Marginal Fear Effect: Bi < 0
In this case, from (13) and (14) respectively, dzi/dZ < 0 and dsi/dzi > 0.
Figure 2 is the analog of Figure 1. Both the φi(Z) and φ¯(Z) curves are
downward sloping. The intersection of the latter with the 45◦ line defines
equilibrium, which is unique. The locus between si and zi is upward sloping.
Consider now a decrease in α. Both curves in the first quadrant shift
to the right, implying an increase in zi for all i. From the left quadrant,
si increases. In this case, a higher input level chosen by the Organization
in response to a decline in α sufficiently improves the marginal benefit from
pre-emption. Thus pre-emption levels increase too.
Combining the cases where the marginal fear effect is weak and where it
is strong, we have
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Figure 2: Non-Cooperative Equilibrium: The Case of Strong Marginal Fear
Proposition 4 Irrespective of whether the marginal fear effect is weak or
strong, there is a unique non-cooperative equilibrium. An increase in the
potency of the Organization leads each target country to step up its security-
deterrence level. Pre-emptive measures are scaled down or up as the marginal
fear effect is weak or strong.
2.6 Cooperation Among All Countries
Countries facing a common terrorist organization may wish to coordinate
their policies to deal with the ‘common enemy.’ What is the nature of the co-
operative solution and how does it compare with that under non-cooperation?
Suppose that in stage 1 all target countries collectively decide si and zi by
minimizing their joint cost. Further let there be compensatory side payments
such that participation in such a grand coalition is not an issue.
In Stage 2 the Organization faces the same optimization problem however
and thus it has the same input supply function (5). In Stage 1, ΣiΩi =
Σi [F (si, g(si, Z)) + βiu(si) + λiv(zi)] is minimized with respect to si and zi.
Using the partials of the g(·) function, the first-order conditions with respect
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to si and zi are:
Fs(·) +
Fx(·)Fsx
c′′ − Fxx
+ βiu
′(si) = 0, (15)
−
I∑
i=1
Fx(·)
c′′ − Fxx
+ λiv
′(zi) = 0. (16)
Eq. (16) captures the internalization of spill-over effects of pre-emption
among the target countries. But notice that (15) is same as (10). It is
because given that CXX = 0, there is no direct cross effect of si on country
j’s cost.17 This leads us to
Proposition 5 Full cooperation in terms of jointly setting deterrence and
pre-emptive measures is equivalent to partial cooperation in terms of coordi-
nating pre-emptive measures only.
To compare the cooperative to the non-cooperative solution, substitute
the implicit function of si in terms of Z derived from (15) into (16) and then
differentiate (16) to obtain
[λiA˜v
′′(c′′ − Fxx)
2 − B˜]dzi − Σj 6=iB˜dzj = 0, (17)
where A˜ and B˜ are defined earlier in (8).18 This equation implies
zi = Φi(Z), with Φ
′
i =
B˜
λiA˜v′′(c′′ − Fxx)2
. (18)
Based on the function Φi(Z), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Compared to non-cooperation, at the cooperative equilibrium,
each country chooses a lower level of security-deterrence (sci < s
n
i ) and the
aggregate level of pre-emptive measures is higher (Zc > Zn). If countries are
symmetric, or they are asymmetric and Bi > 0, then z
c
i > z
n
i ∀i. Otherwise,
zci > z
n
i for some i.
17Hence if pre-emption levels were constant there is no over- or under- provision of
deterrence.
18Check that, in view of (17), our assumption (R3) in A9 implies that the second-order
conditions are being met.
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Proof: Let Φ¯(Z) ≡
∑
iΦi(Z). Suppose Bi > 0 ∀i. Then, as shown in
Appendix 1, 0 < Φ¯′(Z) =
∑
iΦ
′(Z) < 1. If Bi < 0 for all i, Φ¯
′(Z) < 0.
Hence, in general, Φ¯′(Z) < 1. In turn, this implies that, if Zc solves Z =
Φ¯(Z), then, for any particular Z = Z0, Z
c ≷ Z0 if and only if Φ¯(Z0) ≷ Z0.
Now, from the deterrence-setting rule, which is same under both non-
cooperation and cooperation, for any given Z, si is same between the two
regimes, and, comparing (11) and (16), this implies that zi is higher under
cooperation. That is, Φi(Z) > φi(Z). This implies that for any Z, Φ¯(Z) >
φ¯(Z). Hence Φ¯(Zn) > φ¯(Zn) = Zn, implying Zc > Zn (since, as already
proved, Zc > Z if and only if Φ¯(Z) > Z). Because the same negative
locus between si and Z holds both under non-cooperation and cooperation,
Zc > Zn ⇒ sci < s
n
i .
Since Zc > Zn, zci > z
n
i for some i. If all target countries are symmetric,
then, trivially, zci > z
n
i ∀i. Or if Bi > 0, as shown in Appendix 1, Φ
′
i(Z) > 0.
Then ∀i, zci = Φi(Z
c) > Φi(Z
n) > φi(Z
n) = zni .
2.7 Partial Coalition
By cooperation we have so far meant cooperation by all target countries.
Obviously there are transactions costs in forming such a ‘grand coalition’ –
even if side payments are promised. What if only a proper subset of countries
form a coalition?
By definition, such a coalition leaves out other countries who would adjust
their strategies non-cooperatively in response to the formation of the coali-
tion. These adjustments may imply qualitatively asymmetric implications
towards the member countries in the coalition and the ‘outside’ countries –
even if all countries are symmetric otherwise.
In what follows we consider a comparative-statics analysis of the effects of
M out of I target countries forming a coalition, where all countries face sym-
metric parameters with respect to their cost functions. (We do not undertake
a full analysis of alternative coalition formation, deviation from coalition etc.)
While the formal analysis is laid out in the Appendix, the implications are
intuitive. At given level of pre-emption chosen by outside countries, those
in the M-member coalition internalize the externalities from pre-emption
and choose a higher level of pre-emption. Consider the response by out-
side countries. In case the marginal fear effect is weak (respectively strong),
from Proposition 3(B), pre-emption levels are strategic complements (respec-
tively substitutes), which implies that these countries increase (respectively
17
decrease) their pre-emption levels.
Interestingly, regardless of which way the outside countries adjust their
pre-emption levels, their response, per se, constitutes an additional positive
effect on the choice of pre-emption by member countries. When the marginal
fear effect is weak and outside countries increase pre-emption, strategic com-
plementarity also implies that the coalition would increase its pre-emption.
When the marginal effect is strong and outside countries decrease pre-emption,
strategic substitutability implies the same for the coalition.
The overall effect on pre-emption chosen by the coalition is thus unam-
biguously positive. Further, this effect either supplements the increase in
pre-emption by outside countries or outweighs the negative adjustment by
these countries. Hence aggregate pre-emption is higher vis-a-vis the non-
cooperative situation. Finally, given that the level of security-deterrence
chosen by any particular country, inside or outside the coalition, is nega-
tively related to aggregate pre-emption, it follows taht deterrence levels by
all countries decrease. The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 7 A coalition by a proper subset of target countries leads to
(a) a higher level of pre-emption by member countries in the coalition,
(b) a higher or lower level of pre-emption by outside countries according as
the marginal fear effect is weak or strong,
(c) a higher aggregate level of pre-emption, and
(d) a lower level of security deterrence by all countries.
While it is evident that under a grand coalition each country benefits,
in the case of a coalition by some countries, a member country may or may
not benefit. In case of weak marginal fear effect, outside countries increase
their pre-emption levels which benefit the coalition. But if the marginal fear
effect is strong, the negative adjustment in pre-emption by outside countries
imposes a negative externality on the coalition. It is then possible that this
adverse effect outweighs the direct gains from cooperation among the member
countries. All else the same, the smaller the size of the coalition, the greater
is the number of outside countries and hence the greater is the magnitude of
the negative externality effect.
In other words, if the marginal fear effect is strong, then a (partial) coali-
tion may not be sustainable. A sustainable coalition would require a ‘critical
mass’ of countries joining hands together. In what follows, this point is
illustrated through a numerical example.
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An Example. Consider a simple pre-emption game, in which the target coun-
tries choose their pre-emptive activity levels, while security-deterrence mea-
sures are given for exogenous reasons. Let c(xi) and v(zi) functions be x
2
i /2
and z2i /2 respectively, and F (xi) = xi + x
2
i /4. Hence the total cost fac-
ing country i has the expression Ωi = xi + x
2
i /4 + λz
2
i /2. As Fxx > 0,
there is a possibility of negative welfare effect of coalition. Let Ωl denote
the total cost of a country within the M-member coalition, and Ωn its to-
tal cost in the pre-coalition state. It is worked out in the Appendix that if
 = 20;α = 2;λ = 65; I = 28 and M = 3, then Ωl/Ωn = 1.37, i.e., the total
cost under coalition is higher. Hence this coalition does not benefit (even if
the damage from terror is less). The same holds if M = 4. But for M = 5
or higher, Ωl/Ωn < 1. Hence, in this example, ‘5’ is the critical number.
On the other hand, an outside country always benefits, as it enjoys the
positive externality from the enhanced level of pre-emption undertaken by
the countries in the coalition. In summary,
Proposition 8 A coalition always benefits the outside countries, whereas it
may not benefit itself if the size of the coalition is sufficiently small.
3 IntegratingWeak and StrongMarginal Fear
Effects
Thus far we have assumed that the marginal fear effect is either throughout
weak or throughout strong irrespective of the level of terrorist activity. It
may be more realistic to suppose that the society is resilient and can repair
small tears in the social fabric. It is only when the scale of the terror activity
crosses a critical level does the strong fear effect ‘take over.’
In this scenario it seems apt to interpret the strong marginal fear effect
as panic and the weak marginal fear effect as no-panic, and, these terms
will, in fact, be used in the current section. A richer set of possibilities
arise when no-panic gives away to panic after a threshold. As discussed in
the Introduction, apart from no-panic or panic equilibrium, there may arise
brink-of-panic (BOP) equilibria. Also, multiple equilibria of two different
kinds can arise. First, some parameter configurations support both BOP
and panic equilibria. Second, for the same parameter values that permit a
symmetric BOP equilibrium, there exist an infinite number of asymmetric
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BOP equilibria.
All else the same, the analysis integrating no-panic and panic becomes
quite complex however. To keep analytical tractability, we restrict ourselves
to a pre-emption game only, and further assume symmetry of the cost func-
tion of pre-emption, i.e. λi = λ, ∀i.
19 As we shall see, cost symmetry does
not necessarily imply symmetry of pre-emption choices across countries.
‘No panic turning into panic’ is modeled by postulating an expected dam-
age function that is initially concave and then convex in xi – as shown in
Figure 3. This is equivalent to the marginal expected damage being initially
decreasing, and then increasing in the terror input. With some abuse of
notation, we let F (x) denote the expected damage function.
Terror Input
Marginal
Expected Damage
0 XTerror Input
Inflection
point
Expected Damage
0 X
( )xF x
( )F x
Panic
No-Panic
Figure 3: No Panic followed by Panic
3.1 Different Possibilities and Heuristic Arguments
How various possibilities and equilibria may emerge can be understood by
focusing on the problem facing the Organization in stage 2. Recall its first-
19Looking at pre-emption alone is of independent interest, when, for example, security-
deterrence is handled by a different government wing, with deterrence levels impacting
on aspects other than terrorist threat. For instance, too high a level of deterrence would
adversely affect tourism industry and the trade sector of a country. Thus factors other
than security concerns may be more decisive in choosing security-deterrence levels.
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order condition (4). The right-hand-side is the marginal cost of xi and the
left-hand-side is the marginal benefit, which, in our revised notation, is Fx(x).
Figure 4 shows various possibilities, supposing that Z, the aggregate pre-
emption, is already chosen by countries in stage 1.
Clearly, in panel (a), the Organization chooses x1 along the no-panic
portion of the Fx(x) curve. It represents a no-panic equilibrium. In panel
(b), the two curves intersect thrice, at x1, x2 and x3, but the second-order
condition is fulfilled only at x1 and x3. (Multiple intersection does not mean
multiple equilibria.) Given that area A exceeds area B, the Organization
chooses x1. This corresponds to a no-panic equilibrium. Panel (c) is opposite
of panel (b). Area A is less than area B, the Organization chooses x3 and
it corresponds to a panic equilibrium. In panel (d), area A equals area B
and the Organization is indifferent between x1 and x3. We make an intuitive
tie-breaking rule that in case of indifference the Organization does not take
trouble of mounting a high level of activity x3 and selects x1 instead. This
corresponds to a BOP equilibrium. For now we ignore panels (e) and (f).
It follows that, for the same Fx schedule, no-panic, panic or BOP equilib-
rium will occur in stage 1 depending on whether the aggregate pre-emption,
Z, is high enough, low enough or assumes a critical (intermediate) value.
Turning now to stage 1, the choice of Z would critically depend upon
the shift parameter λ of the marginal cost function of pre-emption. If it is
smaller than a critical value, say λ1, the target countries would all choose
high enough zi such that the no-panic equilibrium will prevail. Similarly,
there would exist another critical value, say λ3, so that for λ > λ3 there is a
panic equilibrium.
The BOP equilibrium is associated with a unique level of aggregate pre-
emption, which we will denote as Z˜. What may not be apparent is that
this equilibrium would exist for a range of parameter values, in particular
an interval of intermediate values of λ, not just at a single value. This is
because the marginal damage from terror to country i, at given zj, j 6= i, is
discontinuous with respect to zi and the BOP equilibrium occurs at this point
of discontinuity. Note that, as long as the sum total of pre-emption by other
countries (j 6= i) is not high enough, so that at zi = 0 the Organization selects
x3, a positive but sufficiently small zi induces the Organization to reduce xi
along the panic portion of the Fx curve. But once zi exceeds a critical value,
the Organization ‘jumps down’ to a point such as x1 and accordingly there
is a discrete decline in the marginal damage from terror. The upshot is that
the BOP equilibrium, which is ‘knife-edge’ in terms of the scale of terrorist
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Figure 4: Various Possibilities
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activity and scale of fear, would hold for a parameter range having a positive
measure.
It is also noteworthy that a downward shift of the marginal cost curve
facing the Organization (via a decrease in α) implies a higher Z˜. This means
that along the BOP equilibria, an increase in the potency of the Organization
invites a higher level of aggregate pre-emption – opposite of the effect of a
decrease in α on pre-emption in the no-panic case. This is because averting
panic is the primary objective of target countries in the BOP equilibrium.
3.2 Formal Analysis
We shall work with specific functional forms of the cost and the expected
damage functions. Let
A10: c(xi) = x
2
i /2 and v(zi) = z
2
i /2, and
A11: F (x) satisfy
(a) F (x) : [0,∞)→ [0,∞) is thrice differentiable.
(b) ∃X > 0, such that F (x) = f(x) ∀x ≤ X, where f(x) = ax − bx2/2,
a > α, b > 0 and X = a/b.
(c) For x ≥ X, F (x) = γh(x) such that (i) f ′(X) = γh′(X) = 0, (ii) for
x > X, h′′(x) > 0 > h′′′(x) and (iii) limx→∞ h
′′(x) = 0.20
(d) (1− γh′′(x3(Z))h′′(x3(Z)) + γh′(x3(Z))h′′′(x3(Z)) > 0 ∀Z.
Thus f(x) and γh(x) respectively capture the damage before and after
panic takes effect, with γ parametrizing the strength of the panic effect. We
call γ the ‘panic coefficient.’ Figure 5 illustrates the Fx(·) function and the
marginal cost function facing the Organization.
In view of A10, the Organization’s first-order condition for choosing xi is:
Fx(xi) = Z + α + xi, ∀i. (19)
Thus xi depends on aggregate pre-emption, not its distribution, implying
that the Organization chooses the same level of attack against all countries,
i.e., xi = x.
21 The area A (respectively B) is that between the Fx(·) and
Z + α + xi curves over the interval (x
1, x2) (respectively (x2, x3)).
20An example of h(x) satisfying 4(c) is h(x) = 23 (x−X)
1.5.
21This holds even if the cost functions of pre-emptive measures are asymmetric.
23
a'( )f x
X
'( )γh x
( )
x
F x
B
A
2x
x
Z α x+ +
3x1x
Figure 5: The Marginal Damage Function
The analysis of various cases begins now. For a given Z, if γ is small
enough, there is no intersection of the Organization’s marginal cost curve
with the γh′(x) function. For a single, critical value of γ, the former will be
tangential to the latter and for higher values, there will be two intersections
(since h′′′(x) < 0, there cannot be more than two intersections with the
γh′(x) curve).
To begin with, suppose Z = 0. Consider that value of γ, say γ0, such
that the area A equals area B. Let x10, x
2
0 and x
3
0 denote three levels of xi at
which the Fx curve intersects the marginal cost line Z+α+xi. The following
equation defines γ0:∫ X
x1
0
[α+x−f ′(x)]dx+
∫ x2
0
X
[α+x−γh′(x)]dx =
∫ x3
0
x2
0
[γh′(x)−α−x]dx. (20)
Clearly, for γ < γ0, area A exceeds area B for any Z > 0. Consequently, a
no-panic equilibrium is the only possibility for any λ > 0.
Now consider the case where γ > γ0. There must exist a critical, positive
Z, say Z˜, such that area A = area B, so that the Organization is indifferent
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between choosing x1 and x3. The equation below solves Z˜:∫ X
x1(Z)
[Z + α+ x− f ′(x)]dx+
∫ x2(Z)
X
[Z + α + x− γh′(x)]dx
=
∫ x3(Z)
x2(Z)
[γh′(x)− Z − α− x]dx.
(21)
It follows that no-panic, BOP or panic equilibrium occurs respectively as
Z R Z˜. Further, since a change in λ affects the choice of xi only through its
impact on Z, and, γh′(x) is increasing in γ without bound at any given x,
we have
Lemma 2 Z˜ is independent of λ, decreases with α, and increases without
bound with respect to γ.
3z
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j i
z z
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z z
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Figure 6: Ω1 and Ω3 Functions
We now turn to stage 1 of the game. Because the Organization chooses
either x1(Z) or x3(Z), the total cost function facing any target country can
take either of two forms:
Ω(zi;Z
′, λ) =
{
Ω1(zi;Z
′, λ) = F (x1(zi + Z
′)) +
λz2
i
2
, if zi + Z
′ ≤ Z˜
Ω3(zi;Z
′, λ) = F (x3(zi + Z
′)) +
λz2
i
2
, otherwise,
(22)
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where Z ′ is the sum total of pre-emption used by other countries.22
Clearly Ω1(zi; ·) < Ω
3(zi; ·). Also, z
1(Z ′, λ) < z3(Z ′, λ), where zk(Z ′, λ)
minimizes Ωk(zi;Z
′), k = 1, 3 at a given Z ′.23 Figure 6 illustrates this. The
total cost incurred by country i is read off the Ω1(·) or the Ω3(·) function
according as zi ≷ Z˜ − Z ′.
We are in a position to formally define various equilibria.
Definition. A pre-emption vector (z11 , · · · , z
1
I ) is said to constitute a no-
panic equilibrium if, for Z ′ = Σj 6=iz
1
j , (a) z
1
i = argminzi Ω
1(zi;Z
′, λ) ∀i, (b)
Σiz
1
i > Z˜ and (c) Ω
1(z1i , Z
′, λ) ≤ minzi<Z˜−Z′ Ω
3(zi;Z
′, λ) ∀i.
Definition. A pre-emption vector (z˜1, · · · , z˜I) is said to constitute a brink-
of-panic equilibrium if for Z ′′ = Σj 6=iz˜j (a) z˜i = argminzi≥z˜i Ω
1(zi;Z
′′, λ) ∀i,
(b) Σj z˜j = Z˜ and (c) Ω
1(z˜i, Z
′′, λ) ≤ minzi<z˜i Ω
3(zi, Z
′′, λ) ∀i.
Definition. A pre-emption vector (z31 , · · · , z
3
I ) constitutes a panic equilib-
rium if for Z ′′′ = Σj 6=iz
3
j , (a) z
3
i = argmin Ω
3(zi, Z
′′′, λ) ∀i, (b) Σjz
3
j < Z˜ and
(c) minzi≥Z˜−Z′′′ Ω
1(zi, Z
′′′, λ) ≥ Ω3(z3i , Z
′′′, λ) ∀i.
These definitions are general, independent of the functional forms we
assume. Part (a) says that the equilibrium zi is the optimal point on the
respective Ωk function in its domain. Part (b) specifies whether Z Q Z˜. Part
(c) is an incentive-compatibility constraint saying that it does not pay to a
target country to change zi so as to jump to a point on the alternative cost
function. The BOP equilibrium is shown in Figure 7, while the other two
kinds of equilibria can be shown in similar diagrams.24
Various equilibria in the (γ, λ) space are characterized in Figure 8 and we
have
Proposition 9 Let assumptions A1, A4, A10 and A11 hold. As illustrated
in Figure 8, depending on the paramaters γ and λ, various equilibria arise.
Proof: See the Appendix.
22We explicitly write the parameter λ in the Ω function, since, as we shall see, various
cases depend on the value of this parameter in a systematic way. Other parameters matter
too, but we avoid making them explicit for the sake of notational ease.
23The proof follows from the fact that f ′′ < 0 < h′′ and γh′(x3(z)) > f ′(x1(z)).
24There are two panels, depending on the magnitude of Z˜/I relative to z3 that minimizes
the Ω3 function.
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Figure 7: BOP Equilibrium
Remarks
1. As discussed earlier, BOP or panic equilibria arise only when γ > γ0.
2. For a given γ ∈ (γ0, γ1), no panic (respectively panic) equilibrium ob-
tains if λ is relatively small (respectively large). For intermediate values
of λ, the BOP equilibrium obtains.
3. If, for any given γ, λ lies in-between λ3 and λ2 or in-between λ
′
3 and λ
′
2,
there can be two kinds of equilibria: panic and BOP. Multiple equilibria
essentially arise out of a coordination failure.25 In the BOP equilibrium,
every country expects the others to supply Z˜/I, so that supplying the
same amount is optimal for it. In the panic equilibrium, however, every
country expects the other to supply a lower level of pre-emption at
z3(λ). Thus panic-prevention is too costly, and all countries prefer to
supply z3(λ) instead.
4. We see that if γ > γ1, there is no no-panic equilibrium (which is intu-
itive), and at any BOP equilibrium, the scale of attack is zero. This
will be explained below.
Notice further that, if it exists, a no-panic equilibrium is unique and
symmetric. This follows from the cost function of pre-emption across coun-
tries being symmetric and the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of
25If there were a single target country then λ2 = λ3 and multiple equilibria cannot arise.
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Figure 8: Various Equilibria in the (γ, λ) Space
pre-emption being respectively decreasing and increasing in the level of pre-
emption. The same holds for panic equilibrium by virtue of A11(d), ensuring
that the second-order condition is met.
Given that a panic equilibrium may co-exist with a BOP equilibrium for
some parameter values, it is natural to ask why the same is not true for
the no-panic equilibrium. The reason is that both panic and BOP equilibria
entail relatively “little” aggregate pre-emption. For a panic equilibrium this
statement is almost tautological. Even for a BOP equilibrium, pre-emption
is ‘just sufficient’ to prevent panic from setting in. However, no-panic equi-
librium is associated with a relatively high level of pre-emption. Therefore,
if there is a no-panic equilibrium for some parameter configuration, other
equilibria cannot arise for those parameter values.
We now focus on the BOP equilibria, which is novel. For each symmetric
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BOP equilibrium (given that it exists), we find that there are an infinite
number of asymmetric BOP equilibria.26 To see this, start with a symmetric
BOP equilibrium in which each country ‘supplies’ pre-emption equal to Z˜/I.
Corresponding to this set of strategies, consider another in which country
i’s level of pre-emption is equal to z′i = Z˜/I + i, where (i) i is small and
(ii) Σi = 0. (ii) implies that Σz
′
i = Z˜. Notice from Figure 7 that at the
symmetric BOP equilibrium, Ω1 is increasing in zi. Hence for i sufficiently
small, Ω1 is increasing in z′i whether  ≷ 0. Choosing z′i = Z˜/I + i is thus
preferred to any zi > z
′
i. In conjuction with Figure 8, it is also seen that as
long as λ is either in the interior of (λ1, λ2) or strictly less than λ
′
2, and i
is small enough, we have minzi<z′i Ω
3(zi,Σj 6=iz
′
j) > Ω
1(z′i,Σj 6=iz
′
j). Hence z
′
i is
also preferred to any zi < z
′
i. Thus any country i supplying the pre-emption
level of z′i constitutes a BOP equilibrium.
Intuitively, a BOP equilibrium is intrinsically tied to the panic threat.
Averting this threat is of paramount importance as long as the cost of pre-
emption is not too high. If one of the countries lowers the level of pre-emption
by a small amount compared to an existing symmetric BOP equilibrium, the
other countries have an incentive to make up this short-fall.
We next turn to some comparartive statics. An increase in the potency
of the Organization (a decrease in α) leads to a decline or an increase in
aggregate pre-emption according as it is a no-panic or panic equilibrium.
This is consistent with our analysis in the previous section. Interestingly, if
it is a BOP equilibrium, a higher α implies a higher Z˜, meaning a greater
level of aggregate pre-emption – which is opposite of the response along the
no-panic equilibrium – even though in this equilibrium too the Organization
operates on the no-panic segment of the marginal damage curve. It is because
the sole objective of the countries in the BOP equilibrium is to avert panic.
Consider an increase in γ, the panic coefficient. Along the BOP equilib-
rium, an increase γ implies a decrease in the level of terror input employed by
the Organization. Intuitively, the greater the coefficient of panic, the higher
is the level of pre-emption required to avert panic and thus the smaller is
the scale of attack or terror input used by the Organization. Hence if γ is
sufficiently large, the marginal cost line Z˜+α+x will intersect the f ′(x) line
at point a or above it in Figure 5. This explains why in Figure 8, xi = 0 in
26This is a situation of multiple equilibria in a different dimension compared to the
coexistence of BOP and panic equilibria.
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the BOP equilibrium when γ > γ1.
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Proposition 10 Let assumptions A1, A4, A10 and A11 hold.
(a) Whenever it exists, the no-panic equilibrium is unique and symmetric. A
similar statement holds for the panic equilibrium.
(b) Associated with each symmetric BOP equilibrium are infinitely many
asymmetric BOP equilibria.
(c) In a BOP equilibrium an increase in the potency of the Organization
leads to a higher level of aggregate pre-emption. Moreover, an increase in
the panic coefficient implies a higher level aggregate pre-emption, as well as
a lower scale of attack by the Organization.
3.3 Cooperation
The analysis of cooperative behavior for the no-panic (respectively panic)
equilibrium is quite similar to that for the weak-marginal-fear (respectively
strong-marginal-fear) case analyzed earlier. Consequently, we focus on the
BOP equilibrium, and, in this case, several new insights on the nature of
cooperation emerge.
First, there exist parameter values (namely, λ not too small) such that
the aggregate pre-emption level, Z˜, will be the first best anyway. Thus, the
standard argument for cooperation – that it helps internalize some externality
– does not apply. The intuition hinges on that in the first-best outcome the
countries are constrained to supply ‘enough’ pre-emption, so as to avoid
panic. But this is exactly the symmetric BOP equilibrium. Second, there
is a rationale for cooperation however, if the BOP equilibrium involves an
asymmetric allocation of pre-emption among the target countries. Third,
there is a further case for coordination if there is a panic equilibrium, even
when a BOP equilibrium co-exists. This is because in this case a symmetric
BOP equilibrium Pareto dominates the panic one.
The last two arguments, which favor cooperation, are, interestingly, based
on coordination on the appropriate non-cooperative equilibrium, not on ex-
plicit collusion. Even in the absence of explicit collusion, the presence of
multiple equilibria implies that cooperation can help to coordinate on the
welfare maximizing equilibrium.
27This possibility would not have risen if f(x) satisfied the Inada condition at x = 0.
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We then turn to the formal analysis. In order to focus on the case of
interest let γ1 > γ > γ0, so that there is some role for pre-emption.
28 Under
cooperation the countries jointly solve minz1,··· ,zI IF (x
∗(Σizi)) + λ(Σiz
2
i )/2,
where x∗(·) solves the Organization’s optimization problem. We first look
for solution assuming that it operates in the no-panic region, i.e. x∗(Σizi) =
x1(Σizi). From the first-order conditions it follows that any solution must be
symmetric. Consequently, the symmetric solution is:
zC(λ) =
I(a + bα)
λ(1 + b)2 − bI2
. (23)
It is easy to see that zC(λ) > z∗(λ), where recall that z∗(λ) is the symmet-
ric solution to minimizing Ω1(zi,
∑
j 6=i zj). This is intuitive as the cooperation
internalizes the externalities generated by pre-emption.
However, note that the outcome where every country supplies zC(λ) may
not be the first best, because if IzC(λ) < Z˜ panic will be triggered. In that
case the first best, after taking the possibility of panic into account, involves
every country supplying Z˜/I, so as to avoid panic. If, however, IzC(λ) ≥ Z˜,
then the first best involves every country supplying zC(λ). Given that zC(λ)
is decreasing in λ, the first best involves every country supplying Z˜/I if and
only if λ > λC , where λC solves z
C(λ) = Z˜/I. Given that λC > λ1 (see (23)
and (A.10)), we focus on two cases:
Case 1. λ0 ≤ λ ≤ min{λ2, λC}, so that the first-best outcome involves
every country supplying a pre-emption level of zc(λ), ensuring that panic
is prevented. In this case collusion, internalizing the externalities, would
increase welfare irrespective of the nature of equilibrium.
Case 2. λc < λ ≤ λ2.
29 In this case the first best involves all the
countries supplying Z˜/I, so that the first best outcome coincides with the
symmetric BOP equilibrium. If, moreover, the non-cooperative equilibrium is
symmetric, then the cooperative and non-cooperative outcome is the same,
so that there is no role for cooperation. In case it is asymmetric, how-
ever, cooperation can improve aggregate utility of the target countries by
improving the allocation of pre-emption. This follows since, with convex and
symmetric costs of pre-emption, efficiency involves a symmetric allocation of
pre-emption among countries.
28All the results go through for γ ≥ γ1 if we replace λi by λ
′
i.
29The cases where λ2 < λ < λC , or where λ > max{λC , λ2} yield no new insights and
hence igonored.
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Continuing with Case (2), if λ3 < λ ≤ λ2, then there are both panic and
BOP equilibria. It is straightforward to show that the countries prefer the
symmetric BOP equilibrium over the panic equilibrium. This follows since
Ω1
[
Z˜
I
,
(I − 1)Z˜
I
, λ
]
≤ Ω3
[
z3
(
(I − 1)Z˜
I
, λ
)
,
(I − 1)Z˜
I
, λ
]
< Ω3[z3((I − 1)z3, λ), (I − 1)z3, λ],
where the first inequality follows because the outcome where every country
supplies Z˜/I constitutes a BOP equilibrium, and the last inequality from the
fact that for all λ ≥ λ3, Z˜/I > z
3[(I − 1)Z˜/I, λ]. Consequently, coordination
may help the countries reach the symmetric BOP equilibrium, which welfare
dominates the panic equilibrium.
Summarizing the above discussion we have our next result.
Proposition 11 Let assumptions A1, A4, A10 and A11 hold. Further, sup-
pose that γ0 < γ < γ1 and λC < λ ≤ λ2.
(i) A symmetric BOP equilibrium exists, which, moreover, leads to the first
best outcome.
(ii) If the equilibrium is an asymmetric BOP one, then coordinating to obtain
the symmetric BOP equilibrium is welfare improving.
(iii) If λ3 < λ ≤ λ2 and there is a panic equilibrium, then coordinating to
obtain symmetric BOP equilibrium is welfare improving.
For γ ≥ γ1, very similar results go through.
3.4 Generalizations and Other Possibilities
The preceding analysis has assumed specific forms of the pre-emption cost
function, the cost function of producing terrorism, as well as the damage
function. But many of them were used for the sake of technical convenience
only. For instance, the linear segment of F (x) in the no panic zone, combined
with linear cost function of the Organization, yielded a closed-form solution
of xi in this zone – as well as the possibility that a sufficiently high level
of aggregate pre-emption totally eliminate terrorist attacks. Any general
downward sloping Fx(x) function over x ≤ X would have served the purpose.
The assumptions on Fx(x) over the panic zone implied strict concavity of the
marginal damage function and hence a unique panic equilibria. The main
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insights and particularly how the BOP equilibrium emerges would hold as
long as the marginal damage function is downward sloping initially, and,
strictly concave when upward sloping.
Consider now panel (e) in Figure 4. The marginal damage function is not
concave in its upward sloping range and thus, in the panic region, the Orga-
nization would choose any arbitrarily high level of xi. This is obviously not
a plausible outcome. A natural assumption which eliminates this possibility
would be the existence of an exogenous capacity constraint on the terrorist
organization, say at x¯ (as shown in Figure 4).30 Indeed, the analysis of this
case is simpler – and it does not hamper any of the results we have obtained
– because the panic equilibrium holds at x¯ and it is robust to a marginal
change in Z as long as Z < Z˜.
Finally, in a scenario such as panel (f) there are many intersections of
the marginal damage function (in its upward range) with the marginal cost
function. Multiple panic equilibria is an additional possibility. But, as long
as the Organization’s optimal xi declines with aggregate pre-emption (which
is quite plausible), the BOP and no-panic equilibria would arise the same
way as before.
4 Concluding Remarks and Extensions
Some terrorist organizations operate globally and target many countries. We
have developed a game-theoretic model incorporating the behavior of target
countries and the terrorist organization explicitly. The damage from terror
is defined in terms of the panic or fear it engenders and we have modeled the
implications of a regime swtich from no-panic to panic beyond a threshold
attack level. Both pre-emption and deterrence are considered as counter-
terrorism policy instruments. Our analysis allows us to ask several policy
questions of interest – in particular, if more offense is the best response to
more potential terror. Different kinds of equilibria emerge, including one
which is rather non-standard, namely, the brink-of-panic equilibrium.
One can consider many relevant extensions of the problem we have taken
up, such as more than one terrorist organization, various forms of informa-
tional asymmetries, learning and reputation building, strategic negotiations
30We can think of this constraint as arising from an absolute limit on the funds, or
volunteers available to the terrorist organization.
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etc. In closing, we briefly comment on two direct extensions of our model,
both relating to asymmetry in targeting by the Organization.
This paper has assumed that the Organization targets all countries equally.
What happens when there is differential targeting for extraneous reasons?
This can be modeled by attaching differential weights, say µi, in the objec-
tive function of the Organization to the expected damage caused to a country.
(These weights may be seen as hatred parameters.) Its objective function
can be set up as
Maximize
xi
ΣiµiF (si, xi)− (Z + α) (Σixi)− Σic(xi), Σiµi = 1.
To focus on difference in targeting, let us assume that the countries are
symmetric otherwise, i.e., βi = β and λi = λ.
Consider first the case where the marginal fear effect is either uniformly
strong, or uniformy weak. Straightforward calculations show that if µi > µj ,
then si > sj, that is, a relatively high-target country will choose a relatively
high security-deterrence levels. How do the pre-emptive measures compare?
A relatively more targeted country chooses a relatively lower (respectively
higher) level of pre-emption, if the marginal fear effect is weak (respectively
strong). This is because pre-emption measures are strategic substitutes (com-
plements) if the marginal fear effect is weak (strong). Such asymmetric tar-
geting may have interesting implications for the case of no panic yielding to
panic. In reference to the BOP equilibrium in particular, we conjecture the
possibility that countries facing relatively greater targeting supply the total
level of pre-emption that averts panic, while the other countries free-ride.
Instead of targeting being exogenous, it may be a reaction to pre-emption
levels chosen by target countries. Broadly speaking, this would have the
following implications. First, all else the same, such ‘endogenous targetting’
implies a higher marginal cost of pre-emption activity and this would tend
to reduce the level of pre-emption. Second, insofar as targeting is a function
of the relative magnitude of pre-emption it generates complementarity in
pre-emptive activity: an increase in pre-emption by country i makes the
Organization target country j less than before, inducing the latter to increase
its pre-emptive measures. Third, cooperation among target countries would
contain the element of minimizing the relative effect on targeting through a
choice of relatively more symmetric levels of pre-emption than the intrinsic
source of asymmetry among target countries would have otherwise implied.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
For any square matrix M , let |M | denote the determinant of M . Totally
differentiating the first order condition for the organization, i.e. system (2),
with respect to x1, · · · , xI and sj
dxi
dsj
=
|Nij|
|N |
(A.1)
where |N | is the Hessian of the system (2), where note that the i-th row
and j-th column of N equals Fxx(xi, si) − CXX − c
′′(xi) if i = j, and CXX
otherwise. Further, Nij is the matrix where the i-th column of N is replaced
by the column Cj, where Cj has zero in every element, except the j-th row
which is equal to −Fxs(xj , sj).
For i = j, straightforward manipulations yield that the numerator of
(A.1) equals (−Fxs(xi, si))|N
ii|, where N ii is the N matrix with the i-th row
and column removed. Given A5, the second order condition is satisfied and
thus |N ii|/|N | < 0. As Fxs < 0, it follows that dxi/dsi < 0.
In case of i 6= j, the numerator of (A.1) equals
(−Fxs(xi, sj))CXX(Z + α,X)Y,
where
Y =
∑
1≤k≤I, k 6=j
Fxx(xk, sk)− c
′′(xk)
Note that Y has (I − 1) terms. Since, from A5, Fxx(xl, sl) − c
′′(xl) < 0,
Y is positive for I odd, whereas its negative for I even. Further, recall
that Fxs < 0. Next consider the denominator. Given that the second-order
condition is met, the denominator is positive for I even, and negative for I
odd. Hence the sign of dxi/dsj is the same as that of CXX .
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Proof that the Slope of the φ¯′(Z) < 1 if Bi > 0
We begin with the second-order condition under cooperation. This requires
K to be positive semi-definite, implying that |K| > 0. Using (18),
|K| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
B˜
Φ′
1
(Z)
− B˜ −B˜ ... −B˜
−B˜ B˜
Φ′
2
(Z)
− B˜ ... −B˜
....
....
−B˜ −B˜ ... B˜
Φ′
I
(Z)
− B˜
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (B˜)I
1−
∑
i=1Φ
′
i(Z)
Φ′1(Z) · · · Φ
′
I(Z)
.
(A.2)
By their definitions,
B˜
A˜
=
∑
i
Bi
Ai
.
This, together with Bi > 0 ∀i implies
B˜ > 0; Φ′i(Z) =
∑
i
Bi
Ai
λiv′′(c′′ − Fxx)2
>
Bi
Ai
λiv′′(c′′ − Fxx)2
= φ′i(Z) > 0. (A.3)
Using these and in view of (A.2), |K| > 0 implies
0 < Σiφ
′
i(Z) < ΣiΦ
′
i(Z) < 1. (A.4)
Partial Coalition: Proof of Proposition 7, and Proof of
Proposition 8 by Example
Let zo and zm respectively be the pre-emption level chosen by an outside
country and a member country in the coalition, with zlo and z
l
m denoting
their equilibrium levels. Let zno and z
n
m denote their equilibrium levels of
pre-emption in the pre-coalition state. Given symmetry, zno = z
n
m. Finally,
let Z l and Zn be the aggregate pre-emption in the coalition and pre-coalition
states.
Pre-coalition and coalition equilibria can be conveniently depicted in the
(zo, Z) space. Consider first the behavior of an outside country. It is char-
acterized by eqs. (10) and (11) both before and after the coalition. After
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Figure 9: Coalition
implicitly solving for so, these two conditions imply that the relationship be-
tween zo and Z is same as the φi(Z) function. This is depicted in Figure 9
by the ZZ curve. It is upward-sloping or downward-sloping as the marginal
fear effect is weak or strong. Next, under no-coalition, symmetry implies
zo = Z/I. This is the NN line. The intersection of ZZ and NN solve z
n
o
and Zn.31
When there is a coalition, zm 6= zo, even though countries are symmetric,
and therefore zo 6= Z/I. The first-order conditions with respect to sm and
zm are given by (10) and
−M
Fx(·)
c′′ − Fxx
+ λv′(zm) = 0. (A.5)
This equation is same as (16), except M substituting I.
However, in view of (11) and (A.5), the marginal benefit from pre-emption
31The condition (8) implies that in panel (a) the NN curve steeper than the ZZ curve.
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to one member country is M times that to an outside country.32 Hence
M =
v′(zlm)
v′(zlo)
. (A.6)
It implicitly defines a function zm ≡ h(zo). Thus we can express Z =
Mh(zo) + (I − M)zo ≡ Z(zo). Note that Z(zo) > Izo (because coopera-
tion implies a higher level of aggregate premption by member countries) and
Z ′(zo) > 0. The inverse of this function, Λ(Z), is the LL curve. (It may not
be a straight line.)
The intersection of ZZ and LL defines zlo and Z
l. We are now able to
compare. Aggregate pre-emption is higher in the presence of a coalition, but
the response of outside countries with respect to pre-emption depends on
whether the marginal fear effect is weak or strong. If it is weak, pre-emption
choices are strategic complements and thus outside countries step up their
pre-emption levels. If it is strong, there is strategic substitutability and the
outside countries step down their pre-emption levels.
Furthermore, since si is 1:1 and negatively related to Z and the relation-
ship is the same under coalition or no coalition, Z l > Zn implies sli < s
n
i .
Hence Proposition 7 is proved.
Next we work out the example given in the text, and, this proves Propo-
sition 8. In stage 2 the Organization’s problem yields
xi = g(Z + α) = 2[− (Z + α)]. (A.7)
Under no coalition, this leads to the equilibrium pre-emption by any single
country and the equilibrium level of terror input to any single country equal
to
zn =
4− 2α
2I + λ
; xn =
2(λ− λα− 2I)
2I + λ
.33
Given these expressions and the parametric values specified in the text, we
compute the total cost, Ωn, facing any country in the no-coalition equilib-
rium.
32This holds after solving out so or sm, because (a) the first-order condition with respect
to security-deterrence, i.e., (10), holds whether there is a coalition or not, (b) it is the
same equation for a member country and an outside country and (c) the level of security-
deterrence is dependent of aggregate pre-emption Z, not zi.
33We impose that  > α and λ are high enough such that both zn and xn are positive.
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In the coalition case, the first-order conditions for optimal z are:
−2
(
+
g(·)
2
)
+ λzlo = 0; −2M
(
+
g(·)
2
)
+ λzlm = 0,
respectively for an outside country and a member country, obtained from
(11) and (A.5) respectively. These equations lead to:
zlo =
4− 2α
λ+ 2(I +M2 −M)
; zlm =
M(4− 2α)
λ+ 2(I +M2 −M)
.
Note that zlm =Mz
l
o and thus Z
l = (I +M2−M)zlo. Once we know z
l
o, x
l is
determined from (A.7) and we are in a position to compute Ωl, the total cost
incurred by a member country in the coalition. The text discusses whether
the ratio Ωl/Ωn ≷ 1 corresponding to different values of M , the size of the
coalition.
Proof of Proposition 9
No-Panic Equilibrium
It is already proved in the text that if γ ≤ γ0, then no-panic equilibrium is
the only possibility. Note that γ0 is the solution of the equation Z˜(γ) = 0.
Consider now the case of γ > γ0. The Organization’s first-order condition
(19) reads as a− bxi = Z+α+xi. Thus if Z > a−α, then xi = 0 (terrorism
is completely stopped). Otherwise,
x1i =
a− α− Z
1 + b
. (A.8)
Turning to stage 1, the Nash first-order condition with respect to pre-
emption for any particular country given by
f ′[x1(Z)]
1− f ′′
=
a+ b(Z + α)
(1 + b)2
= λzi. (A.9)
It implicitly defines zi = z
1(Z ′, λ), where Z ′ denotes the sum-total of
pre-emption undertaken by other countries. Eq. (A.9) implies symmetry:
zi = z. The reduced-form solution has the expression:
z¯1(λ) =
{
a−α
I
(⇒ x = 0), if λ ≤ a(1+b)I
(a−α)(1+b)2
,
a+bα
λ(1+b)2−bI
(⇒ x > 0), otherwise.
(A.10)
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Now define γ1 as the solution to Z˜(γ) = Iz¯
1(γ) = a−α. It represents that
high value of the panic coefficient such that if countries prevent panic, they
have to use so high a level of pre-emption that the Organization is forced to
choose xi = 0. We have γ1 > γ0 as Z˜ is increasing in γ.
Consider γ ∈ (γ0, γ1). No-panic equilibrium prevails if and only if λ is
small enough such that Iz¯1(λ) > Z˜(γ). Thus we set up the equation
Z˜(γ) =
a + bα
λ(1 + b)2 − bI
, (A.11)
which implicitly defines a negative relation between λ and γ, say, λ1(γ).
No-panic equilibrium occurs for λ ≤ λ1(γ).
Next, if γ > γ1, then Z˜(γ) > a − α. It is easy to see that there cannot
exist any no-panic equilibrium. It is because no-panic intervention would
require z1 > Z˜/I > (a− α)/I. But at such high intervention xi = 0. Hence
any single country can unilaterally reduce zi by a sufficiently small amount
– and hence save on costs of pre-emption – while still ensuring aggregate Z
to be no less than Z˜ and xi = 0.
As shown in Figure 8, no-panic equilibrium occurs to the left of γ0, and,
between γ0 and γ1 as long as λ is below the λ1(γ) curve.
Next, we consider BOP and panic equilibria in the case where γ ∈ (γ0, γ1),
followed by the remaining case of γ > γ1.
BOP and Panic Equilibria when γ ∈ (γ0, γ1)
Consider first the BOP equilibrium, where Z = Z˜. As will be discussed later,
countries may or may not choose the same level of pre-emption. But for now,
we focus on symmetric BOP equilibrium and the case where γ ∈ (γ0, γ1). We
argue below that, for any given γ in this range, ∃ λ2, higher than λ1 such
that the BOP equilibrium exists if and only if λ ∈ (λ1, λ2).
Analogous to z1(Z ′, λ), define, from now on, z3(Z ′, λ) ≡ argmax
zi
Ω3(zi;Z
′, λ).
While the function z1(Z ′, λ) is derived from (A.9), z3(Z ′, λ) solves the first-
order condition,
γh′(x3(z + Z ′))
1− γh′′(x3(z + Z ′))
= λz. (A.12)
Given A11(e), the l.h.s., equal to the marginal benefit from pre-emption,
is decreasing in zi. Thus z
3(Z ′, λ) is well defined. Furthermore, (i) both
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z1(Z ′, λ) and z3(Z ′, λ) decline in λ and (ii) z3(Z ′, λ) > z1(Z ′, λ).34
Now let Z ′ = Z˜(I−1)/I. One immediate implication is that for λ greater
than, but close to λ1, a BOP equilibrium exists. The argument is simple. For
λ = λ1, in view of (A.11), z
1(Z ′, λ) = Z˜/I. Thus Z˜/I < z3(Z ′, λ). Hence the
U-shape (convexity) of Ω3(z, ·) implies that it is negatively sloped at Z˜/I.
Consider any λ, say λ1 + , close to but greater than λ1 (see the left hand
panel of Figure 7). Because ∂z1/∂λ < 0, z1(Z ′, λ + ) < Z˜/I. It follows
that if country i chooses any z higher than Z˜/I, its cost will increase along
Ω1. Thus it has no incentive to choose any z higher than Z˜/I. Further, by
virtue of continuity, Z˜/I < z3(Z˜(I − 1)/I, λ), which implies that if country
i chooses any z less than Z˜/I, its cost, along Ω3, will also increase. Thus all
the conditions of a BOP equilibrium are satisfied. This is illustrated in the
left-hand panel of Figure 7, which features that z1(Z˜(I − 1)/I, λ) < Z˜/I <
z3(Z˜(I − 1)/I, λ).
As λ gradually increases, both z1(Z˜(I − 1)/I, λ) and z3(Z˜(I − 1)/I, λ)
continue to decline. At a critical value, say λ′, z3(Z ′, λ) = Z˜/I. From the
structure of BOP equilibrium shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 7, it
follows that a symmetric BOP equilibrium exists at this value of λ and by
continuity it will hold in a neighborhood to the right of λ′. This is illustrated
in the right-hand panel of Figure 7. If a country chooses a pre-emption level
higher than Z˜/I, the cost along the Ω1 curve is higher; if it chooses a level
lower than Z˜/I, the minimum cost along Ω3 is higher too.
The right panel of Figure 7 is indicative that the BOP equilibrium holds
up to that value of λ, say λ2, such that the cost of zi = Z˜/I along Ω
1(·)
is equal to the minimum cost along Ω3(·). This is illustrated in Figure 10.
Formally,
Definition. Let λ2 is such that for Z
′ = Z˜(I − 1)/I,
Ω3
[
z3 (Z ′, λ2) , Z
′, λ2
]
= Ω1
(
Z˜
I
, Z ′, λ2
)
.
We now establish that λ2 exists and it is unique. Define
D1(λ) ≡ Ω
3(z3(Z ′, λ), Z ′, λ)− Ω1(Z˜/I, Z ′, λ),
34The proof follows from the fact that given f ′′ < 0, h′′ > 0 and γh′(x3(z)) > f ′(x1(z)),
we have that γh
′(x3(z+Z′)
1−γh′′(x3(z+Z′)) >
f ′(x1(z+Z′))
1−f ′′(x1(z+Z′)) , ∀z.
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Figure 10: Definition of λ2
where Z ′ = (I − 1)Z˜/I . At λ = λ1, for which the no-panic equilibrium
exists, D1(λ) > 0. As λ → ∞, we have Ω
1(Z˜/I, Z˜(I − 1)/I, λ) → ∞,
whereas Ω3(z3(Z ′, λ), Z˜(I − 1)/I, λ) is bounded above by γh[x3(0)]. Hence
D1(λ) < 0, as λ → ∞. By virtue of continuity, there exists λ such that
D1(λ) = 0. This defines λ2. Hence it exists and exceeds λ1.
It remains to show that λ2 is unique. By the envelope theorem,
dΩ3[z3(Z ′, λ), Z ′, λ]
dλ
=
[z3(Z ′, λ)]2
2
.
Further, dΩ1(Z˜/I, Z ′, λ)/dλ = (Z˜/I)2/2. Hence,
dD1
dλ
=
[z3(Z ′, λ)]2 − (Z˜/I)2
2
.
Because z3(Z ′, λ) is monotonically decreasing in λ, so does dD1/dλ, i.e.,
D1 is strictly concave in λ. It is shown in the text that z
3(Z ′, λ1) < Z˜/I.
This implies, dD1
dλ
∣∣
λ1
= [z
3(Z′,λ1)]2−(Z˜/I)2
2
> 0. Further, given that z3(Z ′, λ) is
decreasing in λ, D1(λ) as a function of λ is concave over the interval (λ1, ∞),
implying that D1(λ) = 0 holds exactly at one value of λ. This proves that
λ2 is unique.
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Since dD1/dλ < 0 and D1 = 0 at λ2, it follows that for λ ∈ (λ1, λ2),
D1 > 0 and thus BOP equilibrium holds.
The equation D1(λ) = 0 implicitly defines λ2 as a function of γ. At
any given λ, an increase in γ, ceteris paribus, tends to increase the damage
from panic and thus favors BOP equilibrium. But Z˜ rises too, implying an
increase in the cost of maintaining the BOP equilibrium. Hence the ‘scope’
of BOP may increase or decrease. This translates into λ2 being increasing or
decreasing with respect to γ.
We now characterize the parameter zone such that a panic equilibrium will
exist. This equilibrium is characterized by the first-order condition (A.12).
It implies a symmetric solution, determined by:
γh′(x3(Iz¯3(λ))
1− γh′′(x3(z¯3(λ)))
= λz¯3(λ). (A.13)
Given A11(e), the l.h.s. is declining in zi. Thus z¯
3(λ) is well defined and
decreasing in λ. Clearly, as λ → ∞, z¯3(λ) → 0. For Z ′ = (I − 1)z¯3(λ), let
us define D2 and λ3 such that
D2(λ) ≡ Ω
3[z¯3(λ), Z ′, λ]− Ω1[Z˜ − Z ′, Z ′, λ]; D2(λ3) = 0.
35 (A.14)
A panic equilibrium exists if and only if D2(λ) ≤ 0. We now prove that
D2(λ) ≤ 0 if and only if λ > λ3.
Straightforward differentiation and the application of the envelope theo-
rem yield that for Z ′ = (I − 1)z¯3(λ),
dΩ3(z3(λ), Z ′, λ)
dλ
= −(I − 1)
γh′(x3(Iz¯3))
1− γh′′(x3(Iz¯3))
dz¯3
dλ
+
(z¯3)2
2
= −λ(I − 1)z¯3
dz¯3
dλ
+
(z¯3)2
2
.
dΩ1(Z˜ − Z ′, Z ′, λ)
dλ
= −λ(Z˜ − Z ′)(I − 1)
dz¯3
dλ
+
(Z˜ − Z ′)2
2
.
Hence
dD2(λ)
dλ
= λZ˜
dz¯3
dλ
+
[
(z¯3)2
2
−
(Z˜ − Z ′)2
2
]
< 0, (A.15a)
35The critical value λ3 is analogous to λ2, except that the aggregate level of pre-emption
used by other countries is (I − 1)z¯3(λ) rather than (I − 1)Z˜/I.
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where the last inequality follows since dz¯3/dλ < 0 and Z˜/I > z¯3.
Next, note that as λ → ∞, z3 → 0 (i.e. the individual and aggregate
pre-emption is zero) and thus Ω3[z¯3(λ), Z ′, λ]→ γh(x3(0)), which is finite.36
But Ω1[Z˜ − Z ′, Z ′, λ] → ∞ since the cost of maintaining panic preventing
pre-emption becomes arbitrarily large. Thus
lim
λ→∞
D2(λ) < 0. (A.15b)
Also note that at λ = λ1, given that a no-panic equilibrium exists, a panic
equilibrium cannot exist. 37 Hence
D2(λ1) > 0. (A.15c)
The signs in (A.15a)-(A.15c) prove (i) the existence and uniqueness of λ3,
(ii) for λ > λ3, panic equilibrium holds (as D2(λ) < 0) and (iii) λ3 > λ1.
The equation D2(λ) = 0 implies λ3 as a function of γ. However, just as
λ2, λ3 may increase or decrease with γ for analogous reasons.
We next prove that λ3 < λ2, which implies that if λ ∈ (λ3, λ2), there can
be either BOP or panic equilibria. Define, a function
V (Z ′, λ) = Ω3[z3(Z ′, λ), Z ′, λ]− Ω1(Z˜ − Z ′, Z ′, λ). (A.16)
Note that (i) λ2 solves V (Z
′, λ)|Z′=(I−1)Z˜/I = 0 and (ii) λ3 solves
V (Z ′, λ)|Z′=(I−1)z3(Z′,λ) = 0.
Differentiating eq. (A.16) and using the first-order condition for optimal
pre-emption along the panic equilibrium, we find
dV (Z ′, λ)
dZ ′
= −
γh′
1− γh′′
(
1 +
∂z3
∂Z ′
)
+λz3
∂z3
∂Z ′
+λ(Z˜−Z ′) = λ(Z˜−Z ′−z3),
(A.17)
where the last equality follows from equation (28). For any Z ′ ∈ [(I −
1)z3(Z ′, λ), (I − 1)Z˜/I)], Z˜ − Z ′ − z3 > 0, implying dV (·)/dZ ′ > 0. Hence
V ((I − 1)Z˜/I, λ) > V ((I − 1)z3(Z ′, λ), λ). In turn, this implies λ2 > λ3.
36Zero pre-emption does not imply zero cost of terrorist activity for the Organization;
hence x3(0) is finite.
37Suppose not. Then from the first-order conditions we have that z1 ≤ z3, which is a
contradiction.
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BOP and Panic Equilibria when γ > γ1
As discussed earlier, a no-panic equilibrium does not exist in this range. At
the BOP equilibrium F (·) = 0 as xi = 0. Hence, Ω
1 = λ(Z˜/I)2/2. This
equilibrium holds if
D3(λ) ≡ Ω
3
[
z¯3(λ),
I − 1
I
Z˜, λ
]
− λ
(Z˜/I)2
2
≥ 0.
It is straightforward to establish that D3 is increasing and concave in λ.
Moreover, as the Organization chooses x3 and thus F = γh(·) is bounded
away from zero, for λ sufficiently small, D3 > 0. Since γh(·) is also bounded
from above (at Z = 0), for large enough λ, D3 < 0. Thus there must exist a
unique λ′2 at which D3(λ) = 0, and, if λ ≤ λ
′
2, then D3 ≥ 0 and thus BOP
equilibrium prevails.
Panic equilibrium holds if, for Z ′ = (I−1)z¯3(λ),D4(λ) ≡ Ω
3[z¯3(λ), Z ′, λ]−
λ (Z˜−Z
′)2
2
≤ 0. Similar reasoning as for D3 implies that D4 is positive for small
enough λ and negative for large enough λ. Furthermore, dD4/dλ < 0, the
proof of which is analogous to establishing dD2/dλ < 0. Thus a unique value
of λ, say λ′3 exists at which D4 = 0 and D4 ≤ 0 for λ > λ
′
3; panic equilibrium
holds in this interval of λ.
That λ′3 < λ
′
2 can be proved following the method used earlier to prove
λ3 < λ2. Thus, BOP or panic equilibrium can occur when λ ∈ (λ
′
3, λ
′
2).
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